On September 23, 2026, at 11:52 AM, a high-speed train wrapped in the slogan "ChiNext 50, Tech E-Route Together" departed from Shenzhen North Station. Departing from Shenzhen and heading to Shanghai, it passes through 9 provinces and municipalities including Shanghai, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Hubei, Anhui, Chongqing, and Shandong, covering 77 cities and 178 stations, connecting the two major financial hubs of the Greater Bay Area and the Yangtze River Delta. Train body decals, carriage posters, headrests, table stickers, voice announcements, LED screens, and more repeatedly display the same name — ChiNext 50 ETF Huaan, with the product code printed directly on the headrest covers, providing all-around exposure to high-speed rail passengers. At the scene, Guotai Haitong Chairman Zhu Jian attended, and Huaan Fund Chairman Xu Yong attended, demonstrating an unusual level of importance. In 2026, ChiNext 50 ETF Huaan celebrates its tenth anniversary of listing, and Huaan Fund's marketing has been extremely well-executed with a strong sense of ceremony.

Huaan Fund, from the chairman to all employees, participated fully. A "special livestream" departed along with the named train, broadcasting continuously from the carriages to the venue. This is the first time the public fund industry has named a high-speed rail line, and some have praised it as "the ceiling of public fund marketing history." Of course, more people have raised questions: Is it appropriate for the public fund industry to indiscriminately market high-risk-level (R4, R5) products to the general public? Where is the boundary of financial investment suitability?

ChiNext 50 ETF Huaan, the Product Pushed onto the High-Speed Rail

ChiNext 50 ETF Huaan (159949) was established on June 30, 2016, and is the first ETF in the entire market to track the ChiNext 50 Index. Among ETFs tracking the ChiNext 50 Index, this Huaan Fund product has the best liquidity, the largest scale, and the highest market recognition, leading by a cliff-like margin among its peers, earning the title of "absolute leader." This becomes clear at a glance from the data: as of September 24, 2026, the scale of Huaan ChiNext 50 ETF was 24.336 billion yuan, with an average daily trading volume of 1.471 billion yuan over the past month. The second and third place products had scales of 4.8 billion yuan and 1.8 billion yuan respectively, with average daily trading volumes of 215 million yuan and 87 million yuan. For investors looking to allocate to the ChiNext 50 Index, this product is quite good (from a tool-attribute perspective).

However, this is an R4-level (medium-high risk) equity ETF, tracking the 50 largest stocks by market capitalization on the ChiNext board, with industries concentrated in new energy, pharmaceuticals, and TMT, characterized by high elasticity and high volatility. From a short-term return perspective, its performance is highly problematic. However, the core issue behind the performance is not the product itself, but the index drawdown. Because the ChiNext 50 Index itself is highly volatile, and its constituent stocks are concentrated in the technology growth sector. In the third quarter, AI and tech stocks experienced a major pullback, and ChiNext bore the brunt. For this fund specifically, as of September 24, it had plunged 25% over the past three months — 100,000 yuan invested would now be worth only 75,000 yuan.

Of course, short-term performance does not represent future performance. But this serves as a harsh reminder that investors must fully understand the risks of Huaan ChiNext 50 ETF: index volatility risk — ChiNext 50 has high elasticity, and both rises and falls can be quite dramatic; industry concentration risk — constituent stocks are concentrated in information technology, new energy, fintech, pharmaceuticals, and other sectors; individual stock concentration risk — the top ten holdings account for a relatively high proportion, with heavyweight stocks such as Zhongji Innolight, CATL, and Eoptolink having significant influence; additionally, this product's scale fluctuates greatly, and the risk of capital subscription and redemption volatility should also be noted. At the end of 2025, ChiNext 50 ETF Huaan (159949) surpassed 30 billion yuan in scale, and by the end of the first quarter of this year, its scale had shrunk to 20.6 billion yuan, with the scale at the end of the second quarter being approximately 25.5 billion yuan.

Huaan Fund named a high-speed rail line and reached a massive number of ordinary passengers who had not completed risk assessments, pushing the R4 product code within a foot of the general public's eyes. For an investment product with such a risk level, does this conform to "selling the right product to the right person"? Were risk warnings adequately provided?

Remember the "Dacheng Hang Seng Tech ETF Advertising Debacle"?

ChiNext 50 ETF Huaan has plunged 25% in three months. With such a large-scale advertising campaign, has the fund considered its existing investors? Has it considered whether such a high-risk, highly volatile product is suitable to be promoted this way, and how current holders might be feeling? This is not the first time the public fund industry has sparked controversy over "advertising during losses." In December 2025, a massive Dacheng Fund advertisement appeared in the Shenzhen metro, claiming "the largest Hang Seng Tech ETF in the Shenzhen market." At that time, Dacheng Hang Seng Tech ETF had lost nearly 10% over the past three months. The comment section was flooded with holders saying: "I'm already losing terribly, and you still have spare money for advertising?" "I'm losing money, and you're still promoting loudly — can I tolerate this? Should I tolerate this?" At that time, individual investors accounted for nearly 99% of Dacheng Hang Seng Tech ETF, and its scale surged from 1.243 billion yuan to 4.131 billion yuan in a single quarter. The intent of the advertisement was clear: to continue attracting new capital.

Huaan Fund, this time, spared no expense in naming a high-speed rail line for aggressive promotion, and the intention of scale expansion behind it is abundantly clear. The common problem with both advertising campaigns: they are scale-oriented, using the narrative of "largest scale" to attract new capital during market pullbacks, and both have paid insufficient attention to risk warnings and suitability management. The only difference is that Dacheng Fund placed its advertisement inside a metro station, while Huaan Fund covered an entire high-speed train comprehensively.

Conclusion

ETFs are passive products, and drawdowns are determined by the high-beta attributes of the index, which cannot be simply attributed to the manager or the fund manager. Of course, brand advertising is not inherently wrong, and the public fund industry does need to raise public awareness. But behind these two correct principles, one must still consider: Is it appropriate for Huaan Fund to bring an R4 (medium-high risk) product onto a high-speed rail for indiscriminate scenario-based marketing? Where exactly is the boundary between scale expansion and investor suitability? What is the bottom line of compliance?