Nike's fortunes are growing increasingly grim.

That hardship was made concrete in its latest financial results.

On October 2, the Nike group released its financial report for the first quarter of fiscal 2027.

During the reporting period, Nike's global revenue came in at US$11.21 billion, down 4% year on year, slightly below market expectations, while net profit was US$712 million, down 2% year on year.

The results triggered a sharp sell-off, with US shares plunging more than 10% in pre-market trading on October 2, and the stock now down 46.84% since the start of the year.

What exactly has gone wrong at Nike?

Nine consecutive quarters of decline in Greater China and new releases frequently falling below issue price: Nike can no longer sell in China

The most glaring figure in Nike's report is its Greater China performance.

According to the report, revenue in Greater China for the quarter, running from June 1 to August 31, 2026, was US$1.18 billion, down 22% year on year; on a constant-currency basis the decline widened further to 26%.

Notably, this marks the ninth consecutive quarter of decline in Greater China, and the drop widened again after narrowing in the previous quarter.

Nike once thrived in Greater China, with full-year revenue in the region reaching US$8.29 billion in fiscal 2021, up 24% year on year, making it one of Nike's most important global growth engines.

That year, Nike CEO John Donahoe said: "Nike belongs to China, born for China."

At the time, classic Nike AJ models were so sought after that they were sold by lottery, and resellers could make about 500 yuan by flipping a single "second-draw code."

But fortunes have turned, and Nike now finds itself in the awkward position of being hard to sell even at a discount.

Since the start of this year, many consumers have noticed Nike sneakers being sold at heavy discounts on major online platforms and in physical stores, yet even so, there has been no buying frenzy.

Even more telling is the way new releases have broken their issue price.

Checking the Dewu app, it can be seen that the Jordan Air Jordan 11 Retro "University Blue," a spring 2026 release with an issue price of 1,399 yuan, currently has an average transaction price of 764.73 yuan on Dewu, nearly cut in half.

The Jordan Air Jordan 4 Retro Comic, a summer 2026 release with an issue price of 1,599 yuan, currently has an average transaction price of 848.49 yuan on Dewu.

The Jordan x J. Balvin Air Jordan 4, an autumn 2026 release with an issue price of 1,599 yuan, currently has an average transaction price of 1,404 yuan, with prices sliding steadily almost from the moment it went on sale.

These new releases that have fallen below issue price are a microcosm of Nike in the Chinese market: the premium is gone, and so is the scarcity.

The Greater China performance has also worried headquarters, prompting corresponding adjustments.

On the earnings call, Nike said North America and Latin America would form the Americas market, Europe, the Middle East and Africa would keep their existing structure, and Asia-Pacific and Greater China would be combined into a new Asia-Pacific and Greater China unit.

From the distributor turmoil to the Greater China crisis: where did Nike take a wrong step

Nike's crisis in Greater China had in fact already surfaced and was pushed to a climax in mid-2026.

In July this year, Nike's plan to phase out thousands of online distributors in China was officially finalized, with leading domestic distributors Topsports and Pou Sheng issuing announcements confirming that Nike product sales on online platforms would be fully terminated starting January 1, 2027.

As Nike's largest distributors in the Chinese market, Topsports and Nike have worked together for more than 27 years.

In earlier years, through such channels, Nike captured territory across the Chinese market.

But on the other hand, this left Nike's online channels fragmented and its pricing chaotic, with brand value severely diluted through round after round of discounting.

At the same time, the sportswear sector in which Nike operates is undergoing fierce competition, and in the Chinese market Nike no longer faces only old rivals such as Adidas; instead, growth is being carved away from it across various niche scenarios.

For example, On and HOKA were once regarded as niche trail-running brands, but their growth rates in recent years have far outstripped Nike's.

What they have taken is not the market share of top athlete endorsements, but the incremental users in everyday athletic footwear consumption that once belonged to Nike.

lululemon started with yoga apparel and used community operations and high-end positioning to break into women's sports consumption, directly dividing the high-value customers in Nike's women's product line.

In the past two years, China's sports and outdoor consumption has risen against the broader trend, yet Nike, which held a first-mover advantage, failed to catch this tailwind; the fundamental reason is that in these newly emerging scenarios, Nike has not given people a reason they must buy.

Adidas has concentrated resources on local retail operations and event marketing, Anta has used a multi-brand matrix to occupy the full price range from mass to high-end, and On, HOKA and lululemon have carved away the most affluent consumers through single scenarios, while Nike seems stuck a decade ago, still telling the story of its classic models.